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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Salinas contends the district court erroneously admitted propensity evidence in his
bench trial. The State’s responses ignore the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinions which require
there to be some connection other than mere similarity of the facts in order to admit such
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). In fact, the Court of Appeals’ decision upon which the State
predominanetnly relies has been abrogated by that Idaho Supreme Court precedent. Applying
the proper standard, the other acts evidence in this case is merely propensity evidence
masquerading as motive. Since the district court stated it would consider that improperlyadmitted propenstiy evdience in reaching its verdict, this Court should vacate Mr. Salinas’
conviction and remand his case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Salinas’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of other acts which was not relevant to a
non-propensity purpose.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of Other Acts Which Was Not Relevant To A
Non-Propensity Purpose

A.

The Other-Acts Evidence Was Not Relevant To Mr. Salinas’ Alleged Motive
The State does not contest Mr. Salinas’ explanation about what sort of evidence the

motive exception to I.R.E. 404(b) is designed to admit. (See App. Br., pp.5-6; see generally
Resp. Br.) Instead, it simply argued that, because the other acts were similar in nature and
occurred close in time to the charged conduct, they were admissible under that exception. (Resp.
Br., pp.10-11.) However, the fact that the other conduct is factually similar does not inherently
show what is driving the defendant to engage in either the charged act or the other acts.
Compare State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 679 (2012) (explaining that motive is something like
the defendant acted as he did to get back at his wife for not having sex with him, not the mere
fact that he did something factually similar in the past).

The Idaho Supreme Court has

repeatedly made it clear that, without evidence of such a connection between the two events,
mere factual similarities do not make other-acts evidence admissible under I.R.E. 404(b).
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669 (2010); State v. Grist,
147 Idaho 49, 53 (2009); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 570 (2007); accord State v. Folk, 157
Idaho 869, 878 (Ct. App. 2014).
Rather than apply the standard the Idaho Supreme Court established, the State instead
relied on the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009).
(See Resp. Br., p.11.) However, in comparing this case to Rossignol, the State fails to address
the fact that Rossignol adopted the analysis of an Arizona case which was, in turn, based on
Arizona’s rules of criminal procedure which carve out a specific, special exception for the
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admission of additional propensity evidence in sexual abuse cases. (See App. Br., pp.7-9; see
generally Resp. Br.) As a result, the State’s reliance on Rossignol is problematic because
Idaho’s rules contain no such exception and so, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly,
expressly rejected the idea that there are separate rules for propensity evidence in sexual abuse
cases in Idaho. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668 (explaining the decision in Grist, 147 Idaho at 53).1
Since the analysis upon which Rossignol’s decision turned has been expressly rejected by the
Idaho Supreme Court, the State’s reliance on Rossignol is wholly misplaced.
Finally, the State points to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Russo, but in so doing,
it again ignores the Idaho Supreme Court’s standard for evaluating the evidence in question. The
State believes that Russo simply allows evidence of sexual fantasies to be admitted wholesale
because of their mere similarities to the charged conduct. (Resp. Br., p.12.) However, that
represents an overly-broad reading of Russo. See Folk, 157 Idaho at 877-78. Folk explained that
the critical part of the other-acts evidence presented in Russo was the evidence specifically
linking the fantasies to the defendant’s desire for power and control behavior, as that desire (not
the sexual fantasies themselves) was his motive. Id. However, in Folk, like Mr. Salinas’ case,
where the State presented no such evidence tying the fantasies to an identified motive, the mere
similarity between the fantasies and the charged act alone was not sufficient to make the
fantasies admissible. Id. at 878 (expressly distinguishing Russo on this point).

1

The Idaho Supreme Court does not overrule Court of Appeals’ decisions. State v. Clinton, 155
Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013). Rather, it simply announces what the law is and contrary decisions of
lower courts are, effectively, abrogated. See id. Therefore, though Rossignol was decided six
months after Grist (and failed to take Grist’s rule into account), when Johnson subsequently
reaffirmed Grist, it also effectively abrogated the contrary decision in Rossignol. Therefore,
Rossignol is but a relic of the line of cases Grist itself actually overruled, see Grist, 147 Idaho at
54, not a viable source of precedent for this case.
4

The State attempts to distinguish Folk by reiterating its argument about the other acts in
Folk having occurred several years prior to the charged conduct, whereas the other acts here
occurred close in time to the charged conduct. (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, the remoteness or
contemporaneousness of the other acts offers no insight on whether the two events are “so
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis from original). As a result, the State is still trying to get
other-acts evidence admitted based merely on factual similarities, an approach which the Idaho
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected. Basically, adopting the State’s argument would allow
precisely the type of evidence which I.R.E. 404(b) is designed to keep out of a trial to sneak into
the trial.
Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, there must be limits on the use of
other acts evidence in sexual abuse cases. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. Since the State’s argument
would effectively eliminate the limits the Idaho Supreme Court has put in place, this Court
should reject the State’s attempt to apply a different analysis to that sort of propensity evidence.

B.

Those Aspects Of The State’s Request For This Court Consider Other Exceptions To
I.R.E. 404(b) Which Are Properly Before This Court Are Mistaken Because They Also
Ignore The Applicable Standard Established By The Idaho Supreme Court
In a footnote, the State asserts that this Court might affirm the district court’s decision on

under a different exception to I.R.E. 404(b), specifically, intent or common scheme or plan.
(Resp. Br., p.10 n.5.) As an initial matter, the prosecutor below did not make any arguments
under the common scheme or plan exception to I.R.E. 404(b). (See, e.g., R., p.63 (identifying
only the motive and intent exceptions in the State’s amended notice of intent to use propensity
evidence); Tr., Vol.1, p.33, Ls.10-11 (identifying the same two exceptions at the hearing on the
State’s notice of intent).) As such, the common scheme or plan exception is not properly raised
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for the first time on appeal. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, ___, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017),
reh’g denied; State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 703-04 (2017),
reh’g denied.
At any rate, the State’s argument under the common scheme or plan exception continues
to ignore Idaho Supreme Court precedent, as its argument under that exception was actually
rejected in Johnson.

In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that evidence which shows the

defendant has a particular victim preference or engages in particular conduct toward such victims
is not admissible as common scheme or plan when there is nothing which links the two events to
each other.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669.

Those sort of similarities are “sadly too far

unremarkable to demonstrate” the necessary connection to make the other acts relevant to some
purpose other than propensity. Id. As those sort of similarities are all the State points to in this
case (see Resp. Br., pp.10-11), even if this Court considers the State’s argument under the
common scheme or plan exception, it should still reject that argument. The two acts are simply
not connected to each other by anything except the defendant’s alleged propensity to engage in
that type of conduct.
As to the State’s other alternative argument – that this evidence could be admissible
under the intent exception to I.R.E. 404(b) – the mere fact that Mr. Salinas had those other
conversations does not speak at all to whether he actually intended to engage in the acts
described in those conversations, as opposed to them being merely fantasies.
argument simply assumes that connection exists.

The State’s

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.24, Ls.6-15.)

Operating on such an assumption is inappropriate; that the lack of evidence showing that sort of
connection would make evidence of other acts is precisely what makes such evidence
inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). Folk, 157 Idaho at 878 (distinguishing Russo, where the State
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specifically presented evidence linking the sexual fantasies to the defendant’s motive, from the
case where the State presented no such evidence connecting the other-acts evidence to a nonpropensity purpose).2
Thus, the State’s argument under intent is no more compelling than its argument under
motive – the mere similarity of facts, by itself, is not enough to make those other acts admissible
under I.R.E. 404(b). Id.; accord, e.g., Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. Therefore, this Court should
reject the State’s attempt to introduce this evidence under whichever exception it would seek to
veil that otherwise-improper propensity evidence.

C.

Applying The Proper Standard, This Error Was Not Harmless
The State’s harmless error argument, like its arguments on the merits of this issue,

ignores the standard set forth in the controlling precedent. Specifically, the State contends that,
“[e]ven without the [propensity evidence], a rational fact-finder would still have found beyond a
reasonable doubt, that [Mr.] Salinas attempted to engage in lewd conduct.” (Resp. Br., p.15.)
The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected that sort of analysis in the harmless
error context. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). Idaho uses the Sullivan harmless
error test in assessing all preserved errors. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
As Sullivan succinctly put it: “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict surely would have been rendered,” because “to
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the

2

While the Folk Court did specifically consider the intent exception, it did not discuss the merits
of the State’s argument under that exception because it determined that the defendant’s intent
was not sufficiently at issue given the facts of that case. Folk, 157 Idaho at 879. Mr. Salinas
acknowledges that his defense likely put his intent at issue, but maintains that the other-acts
evidence is not relevant to prove his intent because of the lack of any evidence in those
conversation showing he intended to follow through on the described conduct.
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findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.” Sullivan, 508
U.S. at 279 (emphasis added). That is exactly what the State is asking this Court should do in
this case – usurp the fact-finder’s role and hypothesize a guilty verdict based on this Court’s own
weighing of the evidence. (See Resp. Br., p.15 (asking this Court to weigh the evidence after
taking the propensity evidence out of the equation).) As such, the State’s argument is improper
under the established standards for the harmless error analysis.
It is true that Mr. Salinas agreed to a bench trial instead of a jury trial, but that distinction
makes little difference under Sullivan. In either case, the State’s argument still asks this Court to
hypothesize a verdict which was never, in fact, rendered. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
explained, when the district court fails to consider the appropriate evidence in a bench trial, it is
still the district court which should ultimately conduct the weighing of the proper evidence under
the applicable burden of proof, not the appellate courts.

U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D. v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., 157 Idaho 446, 455 (2014) (explaining that, where the district court failed to
evaluate the relevant evidence during a bench trial, the proper remedy was to remand the case so
the district court could consider the appropriate evidence in light of the applicable burden of
proof); see also Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714
(2014) (reiterating the reasons the district court, and not the appellate courts, should weigh the
evidence in a bench trial scenario). Put another way, when the district court abuses its discretion
in the consideration of evidence, as it has here, “the role of the appellate court is to note the error
made and remand the case for appropriate findings.” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1,
6-7 (2009).
Thus, the proper standard for evaluating harmless error in a bench trial remains for this
Court to determine “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
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unattributable to the error.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis from original); see also Perry,
150 Idaho at 221 (reiterating that the State must prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt). Applying that standard, the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
verdict in this case was surely unattributable to the improperly-admitted propensity evidence
because the district court, the fact-finder in this case, expressly stated it would consider that
evidence in reaching a verdict. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.17 - p.12, L.6, p.14, Ls.10-14.) Since there
was simply no proper basis for the district court to consider that evidence under I.R.E. 404(b),
the record empirically reveals that the error contributed to the verdict. Therefore, under the
proper standard, this error was not harmless.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Salinas respectfully requests this Court reverse the decision admitting the propensity
evidence, vacate his conviction, and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2018.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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